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Dansk resumé af doktorafhandlingen "Megaproject Policy and Planning: 
Problems, Causes, Cures" 
 
Megaprojekters politik og planlægning: Problemer, årsager, løsninger 
 
Af Bent Flyvbjerg 
 
 
Megaprojekter defineres som de dyreste infrastruktur- og investeringsprojekter, der 
udføres i verden i dag, typisk til priser pr. projekt fra nogle hundrede millioner til milliar-
der af dollars. Afhandlingen fokuserer på tre hovedforhold ved policy og planlægning for 
megaprojekter: (1) Problemer i policy og planlægning for megaprojekter, (2) forklarings-
modeller for de identificerede problemer, og (3) metoder til løsning af problemerne, 
såvel tekniske som institutionelt-organisatoriske.  
 
Afhandlingens hovedfokus er på store transportinfrastrukturprojekter, men ved hjælp af 
sammenlignende studier vises det, at afhandlingens konklusioner også gælder andre 
projekttyper, f.eks. dæmninger, kraftværker, vandprojekter, sports- og kulturbygninger, 
messe- og konferencecentre, IT systemer, olie- og gasudvindingsprojekter, rumforsk-
ningsprojekter og våbensystemer. Afhandlingens metoder er statistisk og komparativ 
analyse, dybdeborende interviews, spørgeskemaundersøgelser og teoretiske studier. 
 
 
Problemer i policy og planlægning for megaprojekter 
Afhandlingen identificerer misinformation om projekters omkostninger, benefits og risici 
som det vigtigste problem i policy og planlægning for megaprojekter. En konsekvens af 
denne misinformation er budgetoverskridelser, manglende indtægter og ressourcespild.  
 
For transportinfrastrukturprojekter gælder det, at 9 ud af 10 projekter har overskridelser i 
anlægsbudgettet. Den gennemsnitlige overskridelse for baner er 44,7%, for broer og 
tunneller 33,8% og for veje 20,4%, målt i faste priser og konservativt vurderet. Hertil 
kommer, at standardafvigelserne på de gennemsnitlige overskridelser er store, hvilket 
samlet viser, at den økonomiske risiko på anlægssiden er særdeles høj. 
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På benefit-siden gælder det, at 9 ud af 10 baneprojekter har overvurderede passagerprog-
noser. Den gennemsnitlige overvurdering er her 105,6%, hvilket svarer til, at mere end 
halvdelen af de prognosticerede passagerer aldrig dukker op. 84% af passagerprog-
noserne er mere end 20% forkerte. For veje er 50% af trafikprognoserne mere end 20% 
forkerte, men med en mere lige fordeling mellem over- og undervurderet trafik end for 
baner. Også på benefit-siden er standardafvigelserne store, og igen er dette identisk med 
høj økonomisk risiko.  
 
En konsekvens af de misvisende estimater af omkostninger og benefits er, at de cost-
benefit analyser, som typisk bruges til at begrunde store infrastrukturinvesteringer, bliver 
stærkt misvisende. Ikke blot med nogle få procent, men ofte med flere faktorer. Det 
samme gælder socio-økonomiske vurderinger og vurderinger af virkninger for miljøet.  
 
Afhandlingen viser, at problemet med misinformation om omkostninger, benefits og 
risici er konstant over rum og tid. Fænomenet findes i samtlige undersøgte lande, d.v.s. 
20 lande på 5 kontinenter for omkostninger og 14 lande på 5 kontinenter for benefits. 
Budgetoverskridelserne har ligget på samme høje niveau og trafikprognosernes nøjagtig-
hed er ikke forbedret for den periode, som afhandlingen dækker, hvilket vil sige 70 år for 
omkostninger og 30 år for trafik. Hvis metoderne til at prognosticere omkostninger og 
efterspørgsel er forbedret over tid, så er det ikke noget, som kan spores i de empiriske 
data. 
 
Forklaringsmodeller 
Afhandlingen beskriver og afprøver tre hovedmodeller til forklaring af problemet med 
misinformation: Tekniske modeller (fejl i data og metoder), psykologiske modeller ("the 
planning fallacy", "optimism bias") og politisk-økonomiske modeller (strategisk 
misrepræsentation, løgn).  
 
Afhandlingen forkaster tekniske og psykologiske forklaringsmodeller på grundlag af en 
vurdering af deres "fit" med de statistiske data samt resultater fra spørgeskema- og inter-
viewundersøgelser. Dette forstås i afhandlingen ikke således, at der ikke findes situatio-
ner, hvor de to modeller har forklaringskraft. Men disse situationer er ikke tilstrækkelig 
typiske for planlægning af megaprojekter, til at modellerne opnår en acceptabel forkla-
ringsgrad her.  
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For planlægning af megaprojekter viser afhandlingen, at politisk-økonomiske 
forklaringsmodeller passer bedst med de eksisterende data, og det statistiske "fit" 
bekræftes substantivt gennem interviews og spørgeskemaundersøgelser med 
hovedaktører involveret i policy og planlægning for megaprojekter. Planlæggere og 
projektmagere misinformerer således aktivt og med vilje om de omkostninger, benefits 
og risici, som er forbundet med deres projekter, med henblik på at øge sandsynligheden 
for, at det er netop deres projekt, og ikke konkurrenternes, som bliver godkendt og 
finansieret.  
 
Incitament-strukturen for det enkelte projekt er indrettet sådan, at fordelene ved at misin-
formere er større end ulemperne. Misinformation er rationel adfærd i denne forstand. 
Men den lokale rationalitet i det enkelte projekt leder til global irrationalitet på tværs af 
projekter, hvor resultatet bliver en omvendt Darwinisme med "survival of the unfittest": 
Det er som tendens således ikke det bedste projekt, der vinder, men projektet med den 
"bedste" misinformation,  forstået som den største overvurdering af benefits og den 
største undervurdering af omkostninger og risici. Men dette vil være det dårligste projekt 
målt på faktisk performance i form af budgetoverskridelser, manglende benefits og 
risiko. Det vil med høj sikkerhed også være et projekt, som leder til Pareto-ineffektivitet, 
d.v.s. spild. Sådan er projektet ganske enkelt designet. 
 
Løsninger 
Endelig præsenterer afhandlingen en række reform-foranstaltninger, som er møntet på at 
komme misinformation og den omvendte Darwinisme til livs, og dermed forbedre policy 
og planlægning for megaprojekter. Foranstaltningerne dækker to hovedområder: (1) Ud-
vikling af bedre metoder til at estimere omkostninger, benefits og risici, og (2) etablering 
af incitament-strukturer, der vil begrænse misinformation og fremme information.  Af de 
to typer foranstaltninger vurderes ændrede incitament-strukturer at være vigtigst.  
 
Med udgangspunkt i teorier, som vandt Nobelprisen i økonomi i 2002, udvikler afhand-
lingen den første praktiske anvendelse af en metode, som kaldes "reference class 
forecasting". Dette er en metode, som forudsiger hændelser i projekter – hér planlagte 
megaprojekters fremtidige omkostninger, benefits og risici – på grundlag af allerede 
indtrufne hændelser i en reference-klasse af sammenlignelige projekter. Metoden 
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argumenteres at resultere i mere nøjagtige prognoseresultater end sædvanlige metoder, 
fordi den ved at holde sig til empirisk fastlagte sandsynligheder i reference-klassen 
undgår både optimisme-bias og strategisk misrepræsentation. De første anvendelser af 
metoden fandt sted i 2004 i regi af Finansministeriet og Transportministeriet i 
Storbritannien. I 2005 blev metoden officielt tiltrådt af American Planning Association. 
 
Til forbedring af incitament-strukturen for policy og planlægning af megaprojekter 
argumenterer afhandlingen for en pakke af tiltag omfattende bl.a. bloktilskud til infra-
struktur i stedet for øremærkede midler; uafhængige peer reviews og benchmarking af 
alle prognoser; større offentlig indsigt i prognoser; brug af borgerjuryer o.l. til vurdering 
af projekter og deres prognoser; vurdering af prognoser på faglige konferencer; aktiv 
belønning af nøjagtige prognoser; professionel og juridisk straf til personer og 
organisationer, som bevidst producerer vildledende prognoser; afskaffelse af fuld 
statsgaranti til projekter; minimum en tredjedel privat finansiering af projekter som 
forudsætning for projektstart, også for subsidierede projekter; kontrakter, som gør 
prognosemagere og deres organisationer finansielt medansvarlige for 
budgetoverskridelser og manglende benefits; og endelig én og kun én ansvarlig 
projektorganisation for et projekt.  
 
Hvis incitament-strukturen ændres på denne eller lignende måde, vil det ifølge afhandlin-
gen være muligt at begrænse misinformationen om megaprojekter og nå frem til bedre 
projekter. Hvis incitament-strukturen ikke ændres vil misinformationen sandsynligvis 
fortsætte og brugen af midler til megaprojekter vil fortsætte med at være ineffektiv og 
udemokratisk.  
 
 
Konklusion 
Afslutningsvis identificerer afhandlingen to tendenser, som for tiden driver policy og 
planlægning af megaprojekter i den rigtige retning, d.v.s. mod større effektivitet og mere 
demokrati. For det første har principperne for "good governance" vokset sig stærkere i de 
seneste år i kølvandet på Enron skandalen og dens mange efterfølgere. Disse principper 
har også fundet vej til den offentlige sektor og med samme formål, nemlig at bremse 
finansielt misbrug og fremme bedre administration. Selvom udviklingen er langsom, 
mærkes den også i policy og planlægning for megaprojekter.  
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For det andet har megaprojekter efterhånden vokset sig så store i forhold til nationale 
økonomier, at budgetoverskridelser, manglende efterspørgsel, og risici fra bare et enkelt 
projekt kan destabilisere finanserne i et helt land eller en hel region, som det er sket i 
f.eks. Grækenland og Hong Kong. Parlamenter og regeringer er begyndt at indse, at 
nationaløkonomiske problemer er for stor en pris at betale for den konventionelle måde 
at planlægge megaprojekter. Storbritannien og Holland er foregangslande i denne 
sammenhæng og kan studeres som "best practice". 
 
På den baggrund konkluderer afhandlingen, at der er grundlag for en vis optimisme med 
hensyn til planlægning og policy for megaprojekter i de kommende år. 
 
 
 
 
 1/51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sammenfattende redegørelse for doktorafhandlingen 
Megaproject Policy and Planning: Problems, Causes, Cures 
 
 
 
Af 
 
Bent Flyvbjerg 
Aalborg Universitet 
 
Version 2.0 
October, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2/51 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on problems in megaproject policy and planning and their causes and 
possible cures. After considerations of methodology, the paper first identifies as a main 
problem in megaproject development pervasive misinformation about the costs, benefits, 
and risks involved. A consequence of misinformation is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, 
and waste. Second, the paper explores the causes of misinformation and finds that politi-
cal-economic explanations best account for the available evidence: planners and promot-
ers deliberately misrepresent costs, benefits, and risks in order to increase the likelihood 
that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. This 
results in the "survival of the unfittest," where often it is not the best projects that are 
built, but the most misrepresented ones. Finally, the paper presents measures for 
reforming megaproject policy and planning with a focus on better planning methods and 
improved governance structures, the latter being more important. 
 
 
Introduction 
For a number of years my research group and I have explored different aspects of 
megaproject policy and planning (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter, 2003; 
Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2004, 2005; Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 
2005a, 2005b).1 In this paper I would like to take stock of what we have learned from our 
research so far. 
 First I will argue that a major problem in megaproject policy and planning is the 
high level of misinformation about costs and benefits that decision makers face in decid-
ing whether to build, and the high risks such misinformation generates. Second I will 
explore the causes of misinformation and risk, mainly in the guise of optimism bias and 
strategic misrepresentation. Finally, I will present a number of measures aimed at better 
policy and planning, including changed incentive structures and better planning methods. 
Thus the paper is organized as a simple triptych consisting in problems, causes, and 
cures. 
 The emphasis will be on transportation infrastructure projects. It should be 
mentioned at the outset, however, that comparative research shows that the problems, 
causes, and cures identified for transportation apply to a wide range of other project 
types including power plants, dams, water projects, concert halls, museums, sports 
arenas, convention centers, IT systems, oil and gas extraction projects, aerospace 
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projects, and weapons systems (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter, 2003: 18-19; 
Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002: 286; Flyvbjerg, 2005a; Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). 
 
 
Methodology 
This section focuses on key methodological questions of the research summarized in the 
present paper. First, the research is placed in the context of the overall body of research 
on misinformation in estimates of costs, benefits, and risks in transportation infrastruc-
ture policy and planning. Second, five key steps are identified in the methodological 
design of the research. Third, issues of sampling and data collection are discussed. 
Finally, questions of interviewing are discussed. 
 
 
Four Steps to Understanding Misleading Estimates of Costs, Benefits, and Risks 
Four steps may be identified in the evolution of a body of scholarly research aimed at 
understanding misinformation in estimates of costs, benefits, and risks in large-scale 
transportation investments. The first step was taken by Pickrell (1990) and Fouracre, 
Allport, and Thomson (1990), who provided sound evidence for a small number of urban 
rail projects that substantial misinformation about costs and benefits is a problem, and 
who implied that such misinformation may be caused by deception on the part of project 
promoters and forecasters.  
 The second step was taken by Wachs (1990), who established--again for a small 
sample of urban rail projects--that lying, understood as intentional deception, is, in fact, 
an important cause of misinformation about costs, benefits, and risks. Wachs began the 
difficult task of charting who does the lying--or "strategic misrepresentation" as infra-
structure professionals like to call it--why it occurs, what the ethical implications are, etc. 
Wachs's conclusions for the US were later supported by a study for the UK carried out 
by Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004). 
 The problem with the research in the first two steps is that it is based on too few 
cases to be statistically significant; the pattern found may be due to random properties of 
the small samples involved. This problem is solved in the third step, taken with the work 
summarized in the present paper. Based on a large sample of transportation infrastructure 
projects, it is shown that (1) the pattern of misinformation uncovered by Pickrell and 
others is of general import and is statistically significant, and (2) the pattern is robust 
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across different project types, different geographical regions, and different historical 
periods. It is also shown that the large sample presented here lends statistical support to 
the conclusions about strategic misrepresentation arrived at by Wachs for his small 
sample. 
 The fourth and final step in understanding misinformation would be to do for a 
large sample of different transportation infrastructure projects what Wachs (1990) and 
Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) did for smaller samples: establish the motives and intentions 
of forecasters and promoters and how they affect misinformation. This may be done by 
surveying with questionnaires and interviews a large number of forecasters and project 
promoters, representing a large number of projects, and asking them about what 
happened in specific instances of misleading estimates of costs and benefits, why 
estimates turned out wrong, what the forecasters reasons were for making the estimates 
as they did, etc. Brinkman (2003) has taken a first step in this direction, but much inter-
esting work remains to be done.  
 
 
Overall Design of the Research 
The design of the research summarized in the present paper may be described by the 
following main steps: 
 
1. First, a large sample of transportation infrastructure projects was established with 
the objective to falsify the thesis that cost overruns and benefit shortfalls are 
common in such projects. The thesis could not be falsified. At a very high level of 
statistical significance it was established that cost overruns and benefit shortfalls 
are common in transportation infrastructure development. Data on the size and 
frequency of cost overruns and benefit shortfalls was collected by means of 
questionnaires, from annual reports, from available government statistics, 
national auditors, other studies, etc. Statistical and comparative methods were 
used to analyze variation in the data across project types, nations, continents, and 
time. 
 
2. Second, theoretical studies were carried out in order to identify explanatory 
models for cost overruns and benefit shortfalls. Four types of explanatory models 
were identified: Technical, economic, psychological, and political.  
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3. Third, statistical analysis and in-depth interviews were performed to test the 
validity of explanatory models for cost overruns and benefit shortfalls. It was 
found that political and psychological explanations best accounted for the data. 
 
4. Fourth, based on theories that validly explain cost overruns and benefit shortfalls, 
measures were developed that may help curb overruns and shortfalls. Two types 
of measures were identified: (a) Better  methods for estimating costs and benefits, 
especially reference class forecasting, and (b) Measures of better governance, 
especially improved accountability. 
 
5. Finally, through comparative studies it was established to what extent the results 
found for transportation infrastructure may be expected to be valid for other 
project types. The available evidence suggests that cost overruns and benefit 
shortfalls are neither larger nor smaller for transportation infrastructure than for 
other project types, including power plants, dams, water projects, concert halls, 
museums, sports arenas, convention centers, IT systems, oil and gas extraction 
projects, aerospace projects, and weapons systems. 
 
The following two sections focus on basic methodological questions of how the sample 
of transportation infrastructure projects was established and how the persons for in-depth 
interviews were chosen. 
 
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
The first task of the research reported in this paper was to establish a sample of infra-
structure projects substantially larger than what is common in this area of research. The 
sample had to be large enough to allow statistical analyses of cost overruns and benefit 
shortfalls. Here a first problem was that data on actual costs and benefits in transporta-
tion infrastructure projects are relatively scarce. One reason is that it is quite time 
consuming to unearth such data.  
 For cost data, in public sector projects funding and accounting procedures are 
typically unfit for keeping track of the multiple and complex changes that occur in total 
project costs over time. For large projects, the relevant time frame may cover 5, 10, or 
more fiscal years from planning, until decision to build, until construction starts, until the 
project is completed and operations begin. Reconstructing the actual total costs of a 
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public project, therefore, typically entails long and difficult archival work and complex 
accounting. For private projects, even if funding and accounting practices may be more 
conducive to producing data on actual total costs, such data are often classified to keep 
them from the hands of competitors. Unfortunately, this also tends to keep data from the 
hands of scholars. And for both public and private projects, data on actual costs may be 
held back by project owners because more often than not, actual costs reveal substantial 
cost overrun, and overrun is normally considered somewhat of an embarrassment to 
promoters and owners. In sum, establishing reliable data on actual costs for even a single 
transportation infrastructure project is often highly time consuming or simply impossible. 
 For data on travel demand, in public sector projects it is surprising how often 
count data on actual traffic are simply not produced. And even where the intention is to 
produce the data, projects may develop in ways that make it difficult or impossible to 
compare forecasted with actual traffic. For example, forecasted traffic for a given project 
may be estimated for the opening year, but due to delays, which are common, the actual 
opening date turns out to be several years later than that forecasted, and no forecast of 
traffic was made for the actual opening year. In more general terms, methodological 
differences in how and on what basis forecasted and actual traffic are estimated often 
make comparisons difficult or impossible. Finally, for large projects the elapse of time 
from forecasts are made, until actual traffic can be counted may cover 10-15 years. Over 
such long periods, the assumptions underlying forecasts may be dated and incommensu-
rate when compared with the assumption underlying the way actual traffic is measured; 
or initial plans to compare actual with forecasted traffic may be given up or simply 
forgotten. For private sector projects, traffic typically generates an income for the project 
owner. Budgeting and accounting is commercial, and therefore traffic forecasts and 
traffic counts tend to be more systematic and more conducive to comparative studies of 
forecasted and actual traffic than is the case for public sector projects. This typically does 
not help scholars much, however, because again data are often classified to keep them 
from competitors. And for both public and private projects, data that allow forecasted 
and actual traffic to be compared may be held back by project owners and managers 
because the size and direction of differences between forecasted and actual traffic may 
be of a kind that, if made public, would make the project look bad in the public eye, for 
instance where actual traffic is substantially lower than that forecasted. 
 This state of affairs explains why small-sample studies dominate scholarship in 
this field of research. But despite the problems mentioned, after several years of data 
collection and refinement, for costs it was possible to establish a sample of 258 trans-
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portation infrastructure projects with data on both actual construction costs and estimated 
costs at the time of decision to build. The project portfolio is worth approximately 
US$90 billion (1995 prices). The project types are bridges, tunnels, highways, freeways, 
high-speed rail, urban rail, and conventional (interurban) rail. The projects are located in 
20 countries on 5 continents, including both developed and developing nations. The 
projects were completed between 1927 and 1998. Older projects were included in the 
sample in order to test whether the accuracy of estimated costs improved over time. The 
construction costs of projects range from US$1.5 million to US$8.5 billion (1995 prices), 
with the smallest projects typically being stretches of roads in larger road schemes, and 
the largest projects being rail links, tunnels, and bridges.  
 For traffic, it was possible to establish comparable data for forecasted and actual 
traffic for 210 projects located in 14 countries on five continents, again including both 
developed and developing nations. As far as is known, this is the largest sample of 
projects with comparable data on forecasted and actual costs and traffic that has been 
established for this type of project. 
 In statistical analysis, data should be a sample from a larger population, and the 
sample should represent the population properly. These requirements are ideally satisfied 
by drawing the sample by randomized lot. Randomization ensures with high probability 
that factors that cannot be controlled are equalized. A sample should also be designed 
such that the representation of subgroups corresponds to their occurrence and importance 
in the population. In studies of human affairs, however, where controlled laboratory 
experiments often cannot be conducted, it is frequently impossible to meet these ideal 
conditions. This is also the case for the current study, and a different approach to 
sampling and statistical analysis therefore had to be taken. 
 The projects for the sample were selected on the basis of data availability. All 
projects that the research team knew of for which data on cost and/or traffic development 
were obtainable were considered for inclusion in the sample. Cost development is 
defined as the difference between actual and estimated costs in percentage of estimated 
costs, with all costs measured in fixed prices. Traffic development is similarly defined as 
the difference between actual and estimated traffic in percentage of estimated traffic.  
 Data on cost development defined in this manner were available for 343 projects. 
85 projects were then rejected because of insufficient data quality. For instance, for some 
projects it was not possible to obtain a clear answer regarding what was included in 
costs, or whether cost data were given in current or fixed prices, or which price level 
(year) had been used in estimating and discounting costs. More specifically, of those 85 
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projects, 27 were rejected because it could not be established whether or not cost data 
were valid and reliable. 12 projects were rejected because they had been completed 
before 1915 and no reliable indices were available for discounting costs to the present. 
Finally, 46 projects were excluded because cost development for them turned out to have 
been calculated before construction was completed and operations begun; therefore, the 
actual final costs for these projects may be different from the cost estimates used to 
calculate cost development, and no information was available on actual final costs. In 
addition to the 85 rejected projects mentioned here, a number of projects were also 
rejected to avoid double counting of projects. This typically involved projects from other 
studies that appeared in more than one study or where there was a strong suspicion that 
this might be the case.  
 Data on traffic development were available for 485 projects. A total of 275 
projects were then rejected because of unclear or insufficient data quality. Of the 275 
projects rejected, 124 were rejected because inaccuracy had been estimated in ways 
different from and incomparable to the way it was decided to estimate inaccuracy; 151 
projects were rejected because inaccuracies for these projects had been estimated on the 
basis of adjusted data for actual traffic instead of using original, actual data as it was 
decided to do. In sum, all projects for which valid and reliable data were available for 
cost and traffic development were included in the sample.  
 As for any sample, a key question is whether the sample is representative of the 
population. Here the question is whether the projects included in the sample are repre-
sentative of the population of transportation infrastructure projects. Since the criterion for 
sampling was data availability, this question translates into one of whether projects with 
available data are representative. There are four reasons why this is probably not the 
case. First, it may be speculated that projects that are managed well with respect to data 
availability may also be managed well in other respects, resulting in better than average 
(i.e., nonrepresentative) performance for such projects. Second, it has been argued that 
the very existence of data that make the evaluation of performance possible may contrib-
ute to improved performance when such data are used by project management to monitor 
projects (World Bank, 1994, p. 17). Again, such projects would not be representative of 
the project population. Third, one may speculate that managers of projects with a 
particularly bad track record regarding cost overruns and/or traffic shortfalls have an 
interest in not making data available, which would then result in underrepresentation of 
such projects in the sample. Conversely, managers of projects with a good track record 
for costs and traffic might be interested in making this public, resulting in overrepresen-
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tation of these projects. Fourth, and finally, even where managers have made cost and 
traffic data available, they may have chosen to give out data that present their projects in 
as favorable a light as possible. Often there are several estimates of costs and traffic to 
choose from and several calculations of actual costs and traffic for a given project at a 
given time. If researchers collect data by means of survey questionnaires, as is often the 
case, there might be a temptation for managers to choose the combination of actual and 
estimated costs and traffic that suits them best, possibly a combination that makes their 
projects look good. 
 The available data do not allow an exact, empirical assessment of the magnitude 
of the problem of representativeness. But it is concluded, for the reasons given above, 
that most likely the sample is biased and the bias is conservative. In other words, cost 
overruns and traffic shortfalls estimated from the sample would be lower than those in 
the project population. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results from the 
statistical analyses below. The sample of projects is not perfect by any means. Still, it is 
the best obtainable sample given the current state-of-the-art in this field of research. 
 In the statistical analyses, percentage cost and traffic development in the sample 
is considered normally distributed unless otherwise stated. Residual plots, not shown 
here, indicate that normal distribution might not be completely satisfied. However, trans-
formations (e.g., the logarithmic one) do not improve this significantly. For simplicity, 
therefore, no transformation has been made, unless otherwise stated. The subdivisions of 
the sample implemented as part of analyses entail methodological problems of their own. 
Thus the representation of observations in different combinations of subgroups is quite 
skewed for the data considered. The analysis would be improved considerably if the 
representation were more even. Partial and complete confounding occur; that is, if a 
combination of two or more effects is significant, it is sometimes difficult to decide 
whether one, the other, or both cause the difference. For interactions, often not all the 
combinations are represented, or the representations can be quite scarce. The interpreta-
tions of the data have been adapted to these limitations, needless to say. If better data 
could be gathered, sharper conclusions could be made. 
 The statistical models used are linear normal models, i.e., analysis of variance 
and regression analysis with the appropriate F-tests and t-tests have been made. The tests 
of hypotheses concerning mean values are known to be robust to deviations from 
normality. Also, chi-square tests for independence have been used for count data. For 
each test, the p-value has been reported. 
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 Finally, it should be mentioned that although the sample of transportation infra-
structure projects used in this study is the largest of its kind, it is still too small to allow 
more than a few subdivisions, if comparative statistical analyses must still be possible. 
Therefore, in further work on understanding misinformation in estimates of costs, 
benefits, and risks, the sample should be enlarged to better represent different types of 
projects and different geographical locations. As to project types, data for more private 
projects would be particularly useful in allowing statistically valid comparisons between 
public and private sector projects. Such comparisons do not exist today, and nobody 
knows whether private projects perform better or worse than public ones regarding 
misinformation. The sample should also be enlarged to contain data for more fixed links 
and rail projects. Such data would allow a better (i.e., a statistically corroborated) 
comparative understanding of misinformation for more specific subtypes of projects like 
bridges, tunnels, high-speed rail, urban rail, and conventional rail. Such an understanding 
is non-existent today. As to geography, immediate rewards would be gained from data 
for projects outside Europe and North America, especially for fixed links and roads. But 
even for Europe and North America, data on more projects are needed to allow more 
detailed comparative analysis. 
 
 
In-Depth Interviews 
A key question for the body of research summarized in this paper is whether actors 
deliberately produce the cost underestimates and benefit overestimates documented by 
the research, or whether such under- and overestimates are non-intentional errors.  
 This question raises the difficult issue of deception and lying. Questions of lying 
are notoriously hard to answer, because per definition a lie is making a statement 
intended to deceive others, and in order to establish whether lying has taken place, one 
must therefore know the intentions of actors. In research, intentions are typically uncov-
ered by interviews. But for legal, economic, moral, and other reasons, if actors have 
intentionally manipulated estimates of costs and benefits to get a project started, they are 
unlikely to formally tell researchers or others that this is the case. 
 To illustrate just how difficult it is to obtain this type of information, consider the 
approval to build the multibillion-dollar Øresund bridge between Denmark and Sweden. 
After the Danish Parliament approved building the bridge, it appeared that officials in the 
Danish Ministry of Transport had concealed from Parliament several cost-benefit analy-
ses that showed the bridge would be non-viable. Instead, the ministry had provided 
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Parliament with estimates of costs and benefits that seemed to have been manipulated to 
show viability. Later, when this state of affairs was confirmed by the National Audit 
Office of Denmark (1993), the result was a sharp criticism of the Ministry of Transport. 
It is unlawful to misinform Parliament, and for a while there was talk of conducting a 
formal investigation to place responsibility for the misdemeanor.  
 One of my former students was involved, as a civil servant, in producing the 
estimates of costs and benefits that were given to parliament. When we met at a confer-
ence, I suggested I interview him about how the estimates were arrived at. I argued that 
the Øresund bridge is a historically important project, linking Sweden with Denmark, 
and Scandinavia with Europe, for the first time. The bridge is also one of the largest 
cross-national public works projects in the world, plus among the two or three biggest 
public investments in Danish history. For these reasons, posterity would clearly have an 
interest in knowing how the decision to build the bridge was arrived at, or so I argued.  
 I knew the issue was sensitive and I therefore proposed to my former student that 
he could decide such terms for the uses of the interview that he would be comfortable 
with. He could decide, for instance, that the interview be placed in a sealed envelope 
with the Danish National Archives, not to be opened until a date decided by him, fifty or 
a hundred years in the future if so he preferred. Furthermore, I stated my willingness to 
sign as interviewer a legally binding statement of nondisclosure and nonuse of the inter-
view.  
 With these conditions, still my former student was visibly uncomfortable about 
even discussing the prospect of an interview. He said the interview was not possible, 
excused himself, and hurried away. He appeared profoundly scared, perhaps because he 
knew that any acknowledgment on his part that he or his colleagues had deliberately 
misinformed the minister of the costs and benefits of the Øresund bridge, or that the 
minister had deliberately misinformed Parliament, would stamp them as lawbreakers. 
 It is that difficult to get those who work in environments with political and 
organizational pressure to talk about what really goes on when costs are underestimated 
and benefits overestimated in decision making about large infrastructure projects. This 
makes deception and lying unusually difficult topics for empirical, scholarly research. As 
a consequence, only few studies exist. 
 As far as is known, only two studies exist that have succeeded in getting those 
involved in underestimating costs and overestimating benefits in transportation infra-
structure projects to talk about issues of deliberation and intention. The first study was 
carried out by Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) and covered interviews with 13 public 
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officials, planners, and consultants working in UK transportation policy and planning as 
developers, approvers, or implementers of projects. The interviewees worked with 
national government, local transport providers, and private consultancies. The interview-
ees were chosen for their detailed knowledge of the project development process and 
with a view to covering both central and local government and both the public and 
private sectors. The study was endorsed by the UK Department for Transport, which 
made interviewees more forthcoming with researchers than is usually the case.  
 The second study was carried out by Wachs (1990). This study, which Wachs 
describes as "case study research" covered conversations with approximately 15 
planners, managers, and consultants. The conversations were not structured interviews 
and did not use a standard instrument or survey design (personal communication with 
Martin Wachs, 2006, author's archives). Wachs's study may be described as based on 
exploratory, unstructured interviews, the methodology reflecting the early, pioneering 
stage of the field. 
 Ideally, it would be desirable to interview more public officials, planners, and 
consultants than done by Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) and Wachs (1990). Establishing a 
larger sample of actors willing to be interviewed is a key challenge for future research, 
and a challenge that realistically will be particularly difficult to meet for the reasons 
presented above. At present, the data from the interviews carried out by Flyvbjerg and 
Cowi (2004) and Wachs (1990) are the best that exist regarding whether actors deliber-
ately underestimate costs and overestimate benefits as part of the project development 
process. The data do not present final proof for the role of deliberation in forecasting. 
They do, however, constitute one significant step in a cumulative research process for 
testing whether deliberation plays a role in forecasting and to what extent. 
 
 
Problems in Megaproject Policy and Planning 
Megaprojects generally have the following characteristics: 
 
• Such projects are inherently risky due to long planning horizons and complex 
interfaces. 
• Decision making, policy, and planning is often multi-actor processes with 
conflicting interests. 
• Often the project scope or ambition level changes significantly over time. 
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• Statistical evidence shows that such unplanned events are often unaccounted for, 
leaving budget and other contingencies sorely inadequate. 
• As a consequence, misinformation about costs, benefits, and risks is the norm. 
• The result is cost overruns and/or benefit shortfalls with a majority of projects. 
 
 
The Size of Cost Overruns and Benefit Shortfalls 
For transportation infrastructure projects, Table 1 shows the inaccuracy of construction 
cost estimates measured as the size of cost overrun.2 For rail, average cost overrun is 
44.7 percent measured in constant prices. For bridges and tunnels, the equivalent figure 
is 33.8 percent, and for roads 20.4 percent. The difference in cost overrun between the 
three project types is statistically significant, indicating that each type should be treated 
separately (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002).  
 The large standard deviations shown in Table 1 are as interesting as the large 
average cost overruns. The size of the standard deviations demonstrate that uncertainty 
and risk regarding cost overruns are large, indeed. 
 The following key observations pertain to cost overruns in transportation infra-
structure projects: 
 
• 9 out of 10 projects have cost overrun. 
• Overrun is found in the 20 nations and 5 continents covered by the study. 
• Overrun is constant for the 70-year period covered by the study, estimates have 
not improved over time. 
 
[Table 1 app. here] 
 
 Table 2 shows the inaccuracy of travel demand forecasts for rail and road 
projects.3 For rail, actual passenger traffic is 51.4 percent lower than estimated traffic on 
average. This is equivalent to an average overestimate in rail passenger forecasts of no 
less than 105.6 percent. The result is large benefit shortfalls for rail. For roads, actual 
vehicle traffic is on average 9.5 percent higher than forecasted traffic. We see that rail 
passenger forecasts are biased, whereas this is not the case for road traffic forecasts. The 
difference between rail and road is statistically significant at a high level. Again the 
standard deviations are large, indicating that forecasting errors vary widely across 
projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2005b). 
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 The following observations hold for traffic demand forecasts: 
 
• 84 percent of rail passenger forecasts are wrong by more than ±20 percent. 
• 9 out of 10 rail projects have overestimated traffic. 
• 50 percent of road traffic forecasts are wrong by more than ±20 percent. 
• The number of roads with overestimated and underestimated traffic, respectively, 
is about the same. 
• Inaccuracy in traffic forecasts are found in the 14 nations and 5 continents 
covered by the study. 
• Inaccuracy is constant for the 30-year period covered by the study, forecasts have 
not improved over time. 
 
It is concluded that if techniques and skills for arriving at accurate cost and traffic 
forecasts have improved over time, these improvements have not resulted in an increase 
in the accuracy of forecasts. 
 
[Table 2 app. here] 
 
If we combine the data in tables 1 and 2, we see that for rail an average cost overrun of 
44.7 percent combines with an average traffic shortfall of 51.4 percent.4 For roads, an 
average cost overrun of 20.4 percent combines with a fifty-fifty chance that traffic is also 
wrong by more than 20 percent. As a consequence, cost benefit analyses and social and 
environmental impact assessments based on cost and traffic forecasts like those 
described above will typically be highly misleading. 
 
 
Examples of Cost Overruns and Benefit Shortfalls 
The list of examples of projects with cost overruns and/or benefit shortfalls is seemingly 
endless (Flyvbjerg, 2005a). Boston‘s Big Dig, otherwise known as the Central 
Artery/Tunnel Project, were 275 percent or US$11 billion over budget in constant dollars 
when it opened, and further overruns are accruing due to faulty construction. Actual 
costs for Denver‘s $5 billion International Airport were close to 200 percent higher than 
estimated costs. The overrun on the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge retrofit was $2.5 
billion, or more than 100 percent, even before construction started. The Copenhagen 
metro and many other urban rail projects worldwide have had similar overruns. The 
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Channel tunnel between the UK and France came in 80 percent over budget for construc-
tion and 140 percent over for financing. At the initial public offering, Eurotunnel, the 
private owner of the tunnel, lured investors by telling them that 10 percent “would be a 
reasonable allowance for the possible impact of unforeseen circumstances on construc-
tion costs.”5 Outside of transportation, the $4 billion cost overrun for the Pentagon spy 
satellite program and the over $5 billion overrun on the International Space Station are 
typical of defense and aerospace projects. Studies show that large infrastructure and 
technology projects tend statistically to follow a pattern of cost underestimation and 
overrun. Many such projects end up financial disasters. Unfortunately, the consequences 
are not always only financial, as is illustrated by the NASA space shuttle. Here, the 
cooking of budgets to make this under-performing project look good on paper has been 
linked with shortchanged safety upgrades related to the deaths of seven astronauts aboard 
the Columbia shuttle in 2003 (Flyvbjerg 2004). 
 As for benefit shortfalls, consider Bangkok‘s US$2 billion Skytrain, a two-track 
elevated urban rail system designed to service some of the most densely populated areas 
from the air. The system is greatly oversized, with station platforms too long for its 
shortened trains. Many trains and cars sit in the garage, because there is no need for 
them. Terminals are too large, etc. The reason is that actual traffic turned out to be less 
than half that forecast (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2005: 132). Every effort has been 
made to market and promote the train, but the project company has ended up in financial 
trouble. Even though urban rail is probably a good idea for a dense, congested, and air-
polluted city like Bangkok, overinvesting in idle capacity is hardly the best way to use 
resources, especially in a developing nation in which capital for investment is scarce. 
Such benefit shortfalls are common and have also haunted the Channel tunnel, the Los 
Angeles and Copenhagen metros, and Denver‘s International Airport. 
 Other projects with cost overruns and/or benefit shortfalls are, in North America: 
the F/A-22 fighter aircraft; FBI‘s Trilogy information system; Ontario‘s Pickering 
nuclear plant; subways in numerous cities, including Miami and Mexico City; conven-
tion centers in Houston, Los Angeles, and other cities; the Animas-La Plata water 
project; the Sacramento regional sewer system renewal; the Quebec Olympic stadium; 
Toronto‘s Sky Dome; the Washington Public Power Supply System; and the Iraq recon-
struction effort. In Europe: the Eurofighter military jet, the new British Library, the 
Millennium Dome, the Nimrod maritime patrol plane, the UK West Coast rail upgrade 
and the related Railtrack fiscal collapse, the Astute attack submarine, the Humber 
Bridge, the Tyne metro system, the Scottish parliament building, the French Paris Nord 
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TGV, the Berlin-Hamburg maglev train, Hanover‘s Expo 2000, Athens' 2004 Olympics, 
Russia‘s Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project, Norway‘s Gardermoen airport, the Øresund 
Bridge between Sweden and Denmark, and the Great Belt rail tunnel linking Scandinavia 
with continental Europe. In Australasia: Sydney‘s Olympic stadiums, Japan‘s Joetsu 
Shinkansen high-speed rail line, India‘s Sardar Sarovar dams, the Surat-Manor toll way 
project, Calcutta‘s metro, and Malaysia‘s Pergau dam. The list ends here only for reasons 
of space. 
  
 
Why Cost Overruns and Benefit Shortfalls Are a Problem 
Cost overruns and benefit shortfalls of the frequency and size described above are a 
problem for the following reasons: 
 
• They lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation of resources, i.e., waste. 
• They lead to delays and further cost overruns and benefit shortfalls. 
• They destabilize policy, planning, implementation, and operations of projects. 
• The problem is getting bigger, because projects get bigger. 
 
Let's consider each point in turn. First, an argument often heard in the planning of large 
infrastructure projects is that cost and benefit forecasts at the planning stage may be 
wrong, but if one assumes that forecasts are wrong by the same margin across projects, 
cost-benefit analysis would still identify the best projects for implementation. The 
ranking of projects would not be affected by the forecasting errors, according to this 
argument. However, the large standard deviations shown in tables 1 and 2 falsify the 
argument. The standard deviations show that cost and benefit estimates are not wrong by 
the same margin across projects; errors vary extensively and this will affect the ranking 
of projects. Thus we see that misinformation about costs and benefits at the planning 
stage is likely to lead to Pareto-inefficiency, because in terms of standard cost-benefit 
analysis decision makers are likely to implement inferior projects. 
 Second, cost overruns of the size described above typically lead to delays, 
because securing additional funding to cover overruns often takes time. In addition, 
projects may need to be re-negotiated or re-approved when overruns are large, as the data 
show they often are (Flyvbjerg, 2005a). In a separate study, it was demonstrated that 
delays in transportation infrastructure implementation are very costly, increasing the 
percentage construction cost overrun measured in constant prices by 4.64 percentage 
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points per year of delay incurred after the time of decision to build (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and 
Buhl, 2004). For a project of, say, US$8 billion--that is the size range of the Channel 
tunnel and about half the size of Boston's Big Dig--the expected average cost of delay 
would be approximately $370 million per year, or about $1 million per day.--Benefit 
shortfalls are an additional consequence of delays, because delays result in later opening 
dates and thus extra months or years without revenues. Because many large infrastruc-
ture projects are loan-financed and have long construction periods, they are particularly 
sensitive to delays, as delays result in increased debt, increased interest payments, and 
longer payback periods. 
 Third, large cost overruns and benefit shortfalls tend to destabilize policy, 
planning, implementation, and operations. For example, after several overruns in the 
initial phase of the Sydney Opera House, the Parliament of New South Wales decided 
that every further 10 percent increase in the budget would need their approval. After this 
decision, the Opera House became a political football needing constant re-approval. 
Every overrun set off an increasingly menacing debate about the project, in Parliament 
and outside, with total cost overruns ending at 1,400 percent. The unrest drove the archi-
tect off the project, destroyed his career and oeuvre, and produced an Opera House 
unsuited for opera. Many other projects have experienced similar, if less spectacular, 
unrest, including the Channel Tunnel, Boston's Big Dig, and Copenhagen's metro. 
 Finally, as projects grow bigger, the problems with cost overruns and benefit 
shortfalls also grow bigger and more consequential (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2004: 
12). Some megaprojects are becoming so large in relation to national economies that cost 
overruns and benefit shortfalls from even a single project may destabilize the finances of 
a whole country or region. This occurred when the billion-dollar cost overrun on the 
2004 Athens Olympics affected the credit rating of Greece and when benefit shortfalls 
hit Hong Kong‘s new $20 billion Chek Lap Kok airport after it opened in 1998. The 
desire to avoid national fiscal distress has recently become an important driver in 
attempts at reforming megaproject policy and planning, as we will see later. 
 
 
Policy Implications 
The policy implications of the results presented above are clear: 
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• Lawmakers, investors, and the public cannot trust information about costs, 
benefits, and risks of large infrastructure projects produced by promoters and 
planners of such projects. 
• The current way of planning large infrastructure projects is ineffective in conven-
tional economic terms, i.e., it leads to Pareto-inefficient investments. 
• There is a strong need for reform in policy and planning for large infrastructure 
projects. 
 
Before depicting what reform may look like in this expensive and consequential policy 
area, we will examine the causes of cost overruns and benefit shortfalls. 
 
 
Causes of Inaccurate Costs and Benefits 
Three main types of explanation exist that claim to account for inaccuracy in forecasts of 
costs and benefits: technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations. 
 
 
Three Explanations of Cost Overruns and Benefit Shortfalls 
Technical explanations account for cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in terms of 
unreliable or outdated data, the use of inappropriate forecasting models, honest mistakes, 
lack of experience on the part of forecasters, etc. This is the most common type of expla-
nation of inaccuracy in forecasts (Ascher, 1978; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005; 
Morris and Hough, 1987; Vanston and Vanston, 2004; Wachs, 1990). Technical error 
may be reduced or eliminated by developing better forecasting models, better data, and 
more experienced forecasters, according to this explanation. 
 Psychological explanations account for cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in 
terms of what psychologists call the planning fallacy and optimism bias. Such explana-
tions have been developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman and Lovallo 
(1993), and Lovallo and Kahneman (2003). In the grip of the planning fallacy, planners 
and project promoters make decisions based on delusional optimism rather than on a 
rational weighting of gains, losses, and probabilities. They overestimate benefits and 
underestimate costs. They involuntarily spin scenarios of success and overlook the 
potential for mistakes and miscalculations. As a result, planners and promoters pursue 
initiatives that are unlikely to come in on budget or on time, or to ever deliver the 
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expected returns. Overoptimism can be traced to cognitive biases, that is, errors in the 
way the mind processes information. These biases are thought to be ubiquitous, but their 
effects can be tempered by simple reality checks, thus reducing the odds that people and 
organizations will rush blindly into unprofitable investments of money and time.  
Political-economic explanations see planners and promoters as deliberately and 
strategically overestimating benefits and underestimating costs when forecasting the 
outcomes of projects. They do this in order to increase the likelihood that it is their 
projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. Political-economic 
explanations have been set forth by Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002, 2005) and Wachs 
(1989,1990). According to such explanations planners and promoters purposely spin 
scenarios of success and gloss over the potential for failure. Again, this results in the 
pursuit of ventures that are unlikely to come in on budget or on time, or to deliver the 
promised benefits. Strategic misrepresentation can be traced to political and organiza-
tional pressures, for instance competition for scarce funds or jockeying for position, and 
it is rational in this sense. If we now define a lie in the conventional fashion as making a 
statement intended to deceive others (Bok, 1979: 14; Cliffe et al., 2000: 3), we see that 
deliberate misrepresentation of costs and benefits is lying, and we arrive at one of the 
most basic explanations of lying that exists: Lying pays off, or at least political and 
economic agents believe it does. Where there is political pressure there is misrepresenta-
tion and lying, according to this explanation, but misrepresentation and lying can be 
moderated by measures of accountability. 
 
 
Validity of Explanations 
How well does each of the three explanations of forecasting inaccuracy--technical, 
psychological, and political-economic--account for the data on cost overruns and benefit 
shortfalls presented earlier? This is the question to be answered in this section. 
 Technical explanations have, as mentioned, gained widespread credence among 
forecasters and planners (Ascher, 1978; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2002, 2005; Vanston 
and Vanston, 2004). It turns out, however, that such credence could mainly be upheld 
because until now samples have been too small to allow tests by statistical methods. The 
data presented above, which come from the first large-sample study in the field, lead us 
to reject technical explanations of forecasting inaccuracy. Such explanations do not fit 
the data well. First, if misleading forecasts were truly caused by technical inadequacies, 
simple mistakes, and inherent problems with predicting the future, we would expect 
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a less biased distribution of errors in forecasts around zero. In fact, we have found with 
high statistical significance that for four out of five distributions of forecasting errors, the 
distributions have a mean statistically different from zero. Only the data for inaccuracy in 
road traffic forecasts have a statistical distribution that seem to fit with explanations in 
terms of technical forecasting error. This seeming fit is currently being tested in a 
separate study (Næss, Flyvbjerg, and Buhl, 2006). Second, if imperfect techniques, 
inadequate data, and lack of experience were main explanations of inaccuracies, we 
would expect an improvement in accuracy over time, since in a professional setting 
errors and their sources would be recognized and addressed through the refinement of 
data collection, forecasting methods, etc. Substantial resources have in fact been spent 
over several decades on improving data and methods. Still the data show that this has had 
no effect on the accuracy of forecasts. Technical factors, therefore, do not appear to 
explain the data. It is not so-called forecasting “errors” or their causes that need 
explaining. It is the fact that in a large majority of cases, costs are underestimated and 
benefits overestimated. One may agree with proponents of technical explanations that it 
is, for example, impossible to predict for the individual project exactly which geological, 
environmental, or safety problems will appear and make costs soar. But one must 
maintain that it is possible to predict the risk, based on experience from other projects, 
that some such problems will haunt a project and how this will affect costs. One must 
also maintain that such risk can and should be accounted for in forecasts of costs, but 
typically is not. For technical explanations to be valid, they would have to explain why 
forecasts are so consistent in ignoring cost and benefit risks over time, location, and 
project type. 
 Psychological explanations better fit the data. The existence of optimism bias in 
planners and promoters would result in actual costs being higher and actual benefits 
being lower than those forecasted. Consequently, the existence of optimism bias would 
be able to account, in whole or in part, for the peculiar bias found in most of the data. 
Interestingly, however, when you ask forecasters about causes for forecasting inaccura-
cies in actual forecasts, they do not mention optimism bias as a main cause of inaccuracy 
(Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2005: 138-140). This could of course be because optimism 
bias is unconscious and thus not reflected by forecasters. After all, there is a large body 
of experimental evidence for the existence of optimism bias (Buehler et al., 1994; 
Buehler, Griffin, and MacDonald, 1997; Newby-Clark et al. 2002). However, the 
experimental data are mainly from simple, non-professional settings. This is a problem 
for psychological explanations, because it leaves open the question of whether such 
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explanations are general and apply beyond the simple settings studied. Optimism bias 
would be an important and credible explanation of underestimated costs and overesti-
mated benefits in infrastructure forecasting if estimates were produced by inexperienced 
forecasters, i.e., persons who were estimating costs and benefits for the first or second 
time and who were thus unknowing about the realities of infrastructure building and 
were not drawing on the knowledge and skills of more experienced colleagues. Such 
situations may exist and may explain individual cases of inaccuracy. But given the fact 
that in modern society it is a defining characteristic of professional expertise that it is 
constantly tested--through scientific analysis, critical assessment, and peer review--in 
order to root out bias and error, it seems unlikely that a whole profession of forecasting 
experts would continue to make the same mistakes decade after decade instead 
of learning from their actions. Learning would result in the reduction, if not elimination, 
of optimism bias, which would then result in estimates becoming more accurate over 
time. But the data clearly show that this has not happened. The profession of forecasters 
would indeed have to be an optimistic--and non-professional--group to keep their 
optimism bias throughout the 70-year period the study covers for costs, and the 30-year 
period covered for demand, and not learn that they were deceiving themselves and others 
by underestimating costs and overestimating benefits. This would account for the 
data, but is not a credible explanation. Therefore, on the basis of the data, we are led to 
reject optimism bias as a primary cause of cost underestimation and benefit overestima-
tion. 
 Political-economic explanations and strategic misrepresentation account well 
for the systematic underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits found in the 
data. A strategic estimate of costs would be low, resulting in cost overrun, whereas a 
strategic estimate of benefits would be high, resulting in benefit shortfalls. A key 
question for explanations in terms of strategic misrepresentation is whether estimates of 
costs and benefits are intentionally biased to serve the interests of promoters in getting 
projects started. This question raises the difficult issue of lying. Questions of lying are 
notoriously hard to answer, because a lie is making a statement intended to deceive 
others, and in order to establish whether lying has taken place, one must therefore know 
the intentions of actors. For legal, economic, moral, and other reasons, if promoters and 
planners have intentionally manipulated estimates of costs and benefits to get a project 
started, they are unlikely to formally tell researchers or others that this is the case. 
Despite such problems, two studies exist that succeeded in getting forecasters to talk 
about strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004; Wachs 1990).  
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 Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) interviewed public officials, planners, and consultants 
who had been involved in the development of large UK transportation infrastructure 
projects. A planner with a local transportation authority is typical of how respondents 
explained the basic mechanism of cost underestimation: 
  
“You will often as a planner know the real costs. You know that the budget is too 
low but it is difficult to pass such a message to the counsellors [politicians] and 
the private actors. They know that high costs reduce the chances of national 
funding.” 
 
Experienced professionals like the interviewee know that outturn costs will be higher 
than estimated costs, but because of political pressure to secure funding for projects they 
hold back this knowledge. 
 Similarly, an interviewee explained the basic mechanism of benefit overestima-
tion: 
 
“The system encourages people to focus on the benefits--because until now there 
has not been much focus on the quality of risk analysis and the robustness [of 
projects]. It is therefore important for project promoters to demonstrate all the 
benefits, also because the project promoters know that their project is up against 
other projects and competing for scarce resources.” 
 
Such a focus on benefits and disregard of risks and robustness may consist, for instance, 
in the discounting of spatial assimilation problems described by Priemus (forthcoming). 
Competition between projects and authorities creates political and organizational 
pressures that in turn create an incentive structure that makes it rational for project 
promoters to emphasize benefits and deemphasize costs and risks. A project that looks 
highly beneficial on paper is more likely to get funded than one that does not. 
 Specialized private consultancy companies are typically engaged to help develop 
project proposals. In general, the interviewees found that consultants showed high 
professional standard and integrity. But interviewees also found that consultants 
appeared to focus on justifying projects rather than critically scrutinizing them. A project 
manager explained: 
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"Most decent consultants will write off obviously bad projects but there is a grey 
zone and I think many consultants in reality have an incentive to try to prolong 
the life of projects which means to get them through the business case. It is in line 
with their need to make a profit." 
 
The consultants interviewed confirmed that appraisals often focused more on benefits 
than on costs. But they said this was at the request of clients and that for specific projects 
discussed "there was an incredible rush to see projects realized." 
 One typical interviewee saw project approval as "passing the test" and precisely 
summed up the rules of the game like this: 
 
"It’s all about passing the test [of project approval]. You are in, when you are in. 
It means that there is so much focus on showing the project at its best at this 
stage." 
 
In sum, the UK study shows that strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project 
approval stage to present projects as favorably as possible, that is, with benefits empha-
sized and costs and risks deemphasized. Local authorities, local developers and land 
owners, local labor unions, local politicians, local officials, local MPs, and consultants 
all stand to benefit from a project that looks favorable on paper and they have little 
incentive to actively avoid bias in estimates of benefits, costs, and risks. National bodies, 
like certain parts of the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Finance who fund 
and oversee projects, may have an interest in more realistic appraisals, but so far they 
have had little success in achieving such realism, although the situation may be changing 
with the initiatives to curb bias set out in HM Treasury (2003). 
 The second study was carried out by Martin Wachs (1990, 1986). Wachs inter-
viewed public officials, consultants, and planners who had been involved in transit 
planning cases in the US. He found that a pattern of highly misleading forecasts of costs 
and patronage could not be explained by technical errors, honest mistakes, or inadequate 
methods. In case after case, planners, engineers, and economists told Wachs that they 
had had to "revise" their forecasts many times because they failed to satisfy their superi-
ors. The forecasts had to be cooked in order to produce numbers that were dramatic 
enough to gain federal support for the projects whether or not they could be fully justi-
fied on technical grounds. Wachs (1990: 144) recounts from his interviews: 
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"One young planner, tearfully explained to me that an elected county supervisor 
had asked her to estimate the patronage of a possible extension of a light-rail 
(streetcar) line to the downtown Amtrak station. When she carefully estimated 
that the route might carry two to three thousand passengers per day, the supervi-
sor directed her to redo her calculations in order to show that the route would 
carry twelve to fifteen thousand riders per day because he thought that number 
necessary to justify a federal grant for system construction. When she refused, he 
asked her superior to remove her from the project, and to get someone else to 
'revise' her estimates." 
 
In another typical case of cost underestimation and benefit overestimation, Wachs (1990: 
144-145) gives the following account: 
 
"a planner admitted to me that he had reluctantly but repeatedly adjusted the 
patronage figures upward, and the cost figures downward to satisfy a local elected 
official who wanted to compete successfully for a federal grant. Ironically, and to 
the chagrin of that planner, when the project was later built, and the patronage 
proved lower and the costs higher than the published estimates, the same local 
politician was asked by the press to explain the outcome. The official's response 
was to say, 'It's not my fault; I had to rely on the forecasts made by our staff, and 
they seem to have made a big mistake here'." 
 
Like in the UK study above, Wachs specifically spoke with consultants. He found, as one 
consultant put it, that "success in the consulting business requires the forecaster to adjust 
results to conform with the wishes of the client," and clients typically wish to see costs 
underestimated and benefits overestimated (1990: 151-152).  
 On the basis of his pioneering study, Wachs (1990: 145) concludes that forecasts 
of costs and benefits are presented to the public as instruments for deciding whether or 
not a project is to be undertaken, but they are actually instruments for getting public 
funds committed to a favored project. Wachs (1990: 146, 1986: 28) talks of "nearly 
universal abuse" of forecasting in this context, and he finds no indication that it takes 
place only in transit planning; it is common in all sectors of the economy 
where forecasting routinely plays an important role in policy debates, according to 
Wachs. 
 In conclusion, the UK and US studies arrive at results that are basically similar. 
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Both studies account well for existing data on cost underestimation and benefit overesti-
mation. Both studies falsify the notion that in situations with high political and organiza-
tional pressure the lowballing of costs and highballing of benefits is caused by non-
intentional technical error or optimism bias. Both studies support the view that in such 
situations promoters and forecasters intentionally use the following formula in order to 
secure approval and funding for their projects: 
 
    Underestimated costs 
 + Overestimated benefits 
 = Project approval 
 
Using this formula, and thus "showing the project at its best" as one interviewee said 
above, results in an inverted Darwinism, i.e., the "survival of the unfittest." It is not the 
best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper. And the 
projects that look best on paper are the projects with the largest cost underestimates and 
benefit overestimates, other things being equal. But these are the worst, or "unfittest," 
projects in the sense that they are the very projects that will encounter most problems 
during construction and operations in terms of the largest cost overruns, benefit short-
falls, and risks of non-viability. The projects have been designed like that. 
 
 
Towards Falsifiable Theories 
Figure 1 schematically sums up the relationship between the two types of explanation 
that best fit the data, psychological and political-economic explanations. Psychological 
explanations, which account for the data in terms of optimism bias, have their relative 
merit in situations where political and organizational pressures are absent or low, 
whereas such explanations hold less power in situations where political pressures are 
high. Conversely, political-economic explanations, which account for the data in terms of 
strategic misrepresentation, have their relative merit where political and organizational 
pressures are high--this being common for large, high-profile, public projects with many 
and powerful stakeholders--while these explanations become immaterial when such 
pressures are not present.  
 
[Figure 1 app. here] 
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 Both types of explanation may be falsified or verified by specific, empirical 
evidence. Karl Popper used the famous statement "all swans are white" to illustrate what 
a falsifiable proposition is, and Popper argued that the observation of a black swan would 
falsify this statement. In the same manner the statement "all forecasts are biased due to 
optimism bias"--which was the common view until recently (Kahneman and Lovallo, 
2003; Flyvbjerg, 2003; HM Treasury, 2003)--may be falsified by the observation of a 
forecast that is biased due to other reasons, for instance strategic misrepresentation.  An 
example of such falsification is the evidence uncovered by the interviews presented 
above with public officials, planners, and consultants who have worked on large trans-
portation infrastructure projects. This evidence falsifies the notion that optimism bias is a 
sole and adequate explanation for biased forecasts of costs and benefits in these projects. 
However, rather than compete, the two types of explanation complement each other: one 
is strong where the other is weak, and both explanations are necessary to understand the 
phenomenon at hand--the pervasiveness of inaccuracy and risk in decision making--and  
how to curb it. 
 The two types of explanation also point directly to two different types of 
solutions to the problem of bias in forecasting. First, in situations where it has been 
established that optimism bias is the main cause of inaccuracy we may assume that 
managers and forecasters are making honest mistakes and have an interest in improving 
accuracy. Here improved methods may help. Forecasters will welcome such methods, 
because no one in this situation has reason to be against a methodology that will improve 
their forecasts. 
 Second, when strategic misrepresentation is the main cause of inaccuracy, differ-
ences between estimated and actual costs and benefits are best explained by political and 
organizational pressures. Here forecasters would still need better methods if accuracy 
were to be improved, but forecasters may not be interested in this because inaccuracy is 
deliberate. Biased forecasts serve strategic purposes that dominate the commitment to 
accuracy and truth.  
 Consider, for example, city managers with responsibility for estimating costs and 
benefits of urban rail projects. Here, the assumption of innocence regarding outcomes 
typically cannot be upheld. Cities compete intensely for approval and for scarce national 
funds for such projects, and pressures are strong to present projects as favorably as 
possible, that is, with low costs and high benefits, in order to beat the competition. There 
is no incentive for the individual city to debias its forecasts, but quite the opposite. 
Unless all other cities also debias, the individual city would lose out in the competition 
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for funds. This is the type of situation documented in Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004: 36-58). 
The result is the same as in the case of optimism: actors promote ventures that are 
unlikely to perform as promised. But the causes are different as are possible cures. 
 The existence of strategic misrepresentation does not exclude the simultaneous 
existence of optimism bias, and vice versa. In fact, it is realistic to expect such co-
existence in forecasting in large and complex projects and organizations. This under-
scores that improved forecasting methods must go hand in hand with measures of 
accountability if attempts to arrive at more accurate forecasts is to be effective. Such 
attempts are the concern of the following section. 
 
 
Cures: The Need for Reform in Megaproject Policy and Planning 
As should be clear, the planning and implementation of large infrastructure projects 
stand in need of reform. Less deception and more honesty are needed in the estimation of 
costs and benefits if better projects are to be implemented. This is not to say that costs 
and benefits are or should be the only basis for deciding whether to build large infra-
structure projects. Clearly, forms of rationality other than economic rationality are at 
work in most projects and are balanced in the broader frame of public decision making. 
But the costs and benefits of large infrastructure projects often run in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars, with risks correspondingly high. Without knowledge of such risks, 
decisions are likely to be flawed.  
 When contemplating what planners can do to help reform come about, we need to 
distinguish between two fundamentally different situations: (1) planners and promoters 
consider it important to get forecasts of costs, benefits, and risks right, and (2) planners 
and promoters do not consider it important to get forecasts right, because optimistic 
forecasts are seen as a necessary means to getting projects started. The first situation is 
the easier one to deal with and here better methodology will go a long way in improving 
planning and decision making. The second situation is more difficult, and more common 
as we saw above. Here changed incentives are essential in order to reward honesty and 
punish deception, where today's incentives often do the opposite. 
 Thus two main measures of reform may be identified: (1) better forecasting 
methods, and (2) improved incentive structures, with the latter being more important. 
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Better Methods: Reference Class Forecasting 
If planners genuinely consider it important to get forecasts right, it is recommended they 
use a new forecasting method called "reference class forecasting" to reduce inaccuracy 
and bias. This method was originally developed to compensate for the type of cognitive 
bias in human forecasting that Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman found in his 
Nobel prize-winning work on bias in economic forecasting (Kahneman, 1994; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Reference class forecasting has proven more accurate 
than conventional forecasting. Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) developed the first instance of 
practical reference class forecasting.6 Later, the UK Department for Transport and HM 
Treasury decided to employ the method in the UK as part of project appraisal. They 
placed guidelines on how to use the method on their websites, for local government and 
consultants to follow. In April 2005, based on a study by Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 
(2005), the American Planning Association (2005) officially endorsed reference class 
forecasting: 
 
 "APA encourages planners to use reference class forecasting in addition to tradi-
tional methods as a way to improve accuracy. The reference class forecasting 
method is beneficial for non-routine projects such as stadiums, museums, exhibit 
centers, and other local one-off projects. Planners should never rely solely on 
civil engineering technology as a way to generate project forecasts."  
 
For reasons of space, here only an outline of the method is presented, based mainly on 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) and Flyvbjerg (2003). 
Reference class forecasting consists in taking a so-called "outside view" on the 
particular project being forecast. The outside view is established on the basis of informa-
tion from a class of similar projects. The outside view does not try to forecast the specific 
uncertain events that will affect the particular project, but instead places the project in a 
statistical distribution of outcomes from this class of reference projects. Reference class 
forecasting requires the following three steps for the individual project: 
 
(1) Identification of a relevant reference class of past projects. The class must be 
broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly compa-
rable with the specific project. 
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(2) Establishing a probability distribution for the selected reference class. 
This requires access to credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of projects 
within the reference class to make statistically meaningful conclusions. 
(3) Comparing the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to 
establish the most likely outcome for the specific project.  
 
Daniel Kahneman relates the following story about curriculum planning to illustrate 
reference class forecasting in practice (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003: 61). This example 
is used, because similar examples do not exist as yet in the field of infrastructure 
planning. Some years ago, Kahneman was involved in a project to develop a curriculum 
for a new subject area for high schools in Israel. The project was carried out by a team of 
academics and teachers. In time, the team began to discuss how long the project would 
take to complete. Everyone on the team was asked to write on a slip of paper the number 
of months needed to finish and report the project. The estimates ranged from 18 to 30 
months. One of the team members--a distinguished expert in curriculum development--
was then posed a challenge by another team member to recall as many projects similar to 
theirs as possible and to think of these projects as they were in a stage comparable to 
their project. "How long did it take them at that point to reach completion?", the expert 
was asked. After a while he answered that not all the comparable teams he could think of 
ever did complete their task. About 40 percent of them eventually gave up. Of those 
remaining, the expert could not think of any that completed their task in less than seven 
years, nor of any that took more than ten. The expert was then asked if he had reason to 
believe that the present team was more skilled in curriculum development than the earlier 
ones had been. The expert said no, he did not see any relevant factor that distinguished 
this team favorably from the teams he had been thinking about. His impression was that 
the present team was slightly below average in terms of resources and potential. The 
wise decision at this point would probably have been for the team to break up, according 
to Kahneman. Instead, the members ignored the pessimistic information and proceeded 
with the project. They finally completed the project eight years later, and their efforts 
went largely wasted--the resulting curriculum was rarely used. 
 In this example, the curriculum expert made two forecasts for the same problem 
and arrived at very different answers. The first forecast was the inside view; the second 
was the outside view, or the reference class forecast. The inside view is the one that the 
expert and the other team members adopted. They made forecasts by focusing tightly on 
the case at hand, considering its objective, the resources they brought to it, and the 
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obstacles to its completion. They constructed in their minds scenarios of their coming 
progress and extrapolated current trends into the future. The resulting forecasts, even the 
most conservative ones, were overly optimistic. The outside view is the one provoked by 
the question to the curriculum expert. It completely ignored the details of the project at 
hand, and it involved no attempt at forecasting the events that would influence the 
project's future course. Instead, it examined the experiences of a class of similar projects, 
laid out a rough distribution of outcomes for this reference class, and then positioned the 
current project in that distribution. The resulting forecast, as it turned out, was much 
more accurate. 
 Similarly--to take an example from the work with developing reference class 
forecasting for practical infrastructure planning--planners in a city preparing to build a 
new subway would, first, establish a reference class of comparable projects. This could 
be the relevant rail projects from the sample used for this article. Through analyses the 
planners would establish that the projects included in the reference class were indeed 
comparable. Second, if the planners were concerned, for example, with getting construc-
tion cost estimates right, they would then establish the distribution of outcomes for the 
reference class regarding the accuracy of construction cost forecasts. Figure 2 shows 
what this distribution looks like for a reference class relevant to building subways in the 
UK, developed by Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004: 23) for the UK Department for Transport. 
Third, the planners would compare their subway project to the reference class distribu-
tion. This would make it clear to the planners that unless they have reason to believe they 
are substantially better forecasters and planners than their colleagues who did the 
forecasts and planning for projects in the reference class, they are likely to grossly under-
estimate construction costs. Finally, planners would then use this knowledge to adjust 
their forecasts for more realism. Figure 3 shows what such adjustments are for the UK 
situation. More specifically, Figure 3 shows that for a forecast of construction costs for a 
rail project, which has been planned in the manner that such projects are usually planned, 
i.e., like the projects in the reference class, this forecast would have to be adjusted 
upwards by 40 percent, if investors were willing to accept a risk of cost overrun of 50 
percent. If investors were willing to accept a risk of overrun of only 10 percent, the uplift 
would have to be 68 percent. For a rail project initially estimated at, say £4 billion, the 
uplifts for the 50 and 10 percent levels of risk of cost overrun would be £1.6 billion and 
£2.7 billion, respectively. 
 
[Figures 2 and 3 app. here] 
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 The contrast between inside and outside views has been confirmed by systematic 
research (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002). The research shows that when people 
are asked simple questions requiring them to take an outside view, their forecasts become 
significantly more accurate. However, most individuals and organizations are inclined to 
adopt the inside view in planning major initiatives. This is the conventional and intuitive 
approach. The traditional way to think about a complex project is to focus on the project 
itself and its details, to bring to bear what one knows about it, paying special attention to 
its unique or unusual features, trying to predict the events that will influence its future. 
The thought of going out and gathering simple statistics about related cases seldom 
enters a planner's mind. This is the case in general, according to Lovallo and Kahneman 
(2003: 61-62). And it is certainly the case for cost and benefit forecasting in large infra-
structure projects. Despite the many forecasts reviewed for the present study, not a single 
genuine reference class forecast of costs and benefits has been identified.7 
 While understandable, planners' preference for the inside view over the outside 
view is unfortunate. When both forecasting methods are applied with equal skill, the 
outside view is much more likely to produce a realistic estimate. That is because it 
bypasses cognitive and political biases such as optimism bias and strategic misrepresen-
tation and cuts directly to outcomes. In the outside view planners and forecasters are not 
required to make scenarios, imagine events, or gauge their own and others' levels of 
ability and control, so they cannot get all these things wrong. Human bias is bypassed. 
Undoubtedly the outside view, being based on historical precedent, may fail to predict 
extreme outcomes, that is, those that lie outside all historical precedents. But for most 
projects, the outside view will produce more accurate results. In contrast, a focus on 
inside details is the road to inaccuracy. 
 The comparative advantage of the outside view is most pronounced for non-
routine projects, understood as projects that planners and decision makers in a certain 
locale have never attempted before--like building an urban rail system in a city for the 
first time, or a new major bridge or tunnel where none existed before. It is in the 
planning of such new efforts that the biases toward optimism and strategic misrepresen-
tation are likely to be largest. To be sure, choosing the right reference class of compara-
tive past projects becomes more difficult when planners are forecasting initiatives for 
which precedents are not easily found, for instance the introduction of new and unfamil-
iar technologies. However, most large infrastructure projects are both non-routine locally 
and use well-known technologies. Such projects are, therefore, particularly likely to 
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benefit from the outside view and reference class forecasting. The same holds for concert 
halls, museums, stadiums, exhibition centers, and other local one-off projects. 
 
 
Improved Incentives: Public and Private Sector Accountability 
In the present section we consider the situation where planners and other influential 
actors do not find it important to get forecasts right and where planners, therefore, do not 
help to clarify and mitigate risk but, instead, generate and exacerbate it. Here planners 
are part of the problem, not the solution. This situation may need some explication, 
because it possibly sounds to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be 
agreed that planners ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in forecasting. 
It is even stated as an explicit requirement in the American Institute of Certified 
Planners' Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct that "A planner must strive to provide 
full, clear and accurate information on planning issues to citizens and governmental 
decision-makers" (American Planning Association, 1991: A.3). The British Royal Town 
Planning Institute has laid down similar obligations for its members (Royal Town 
Planning Institute, 2001). 
However, the literature is replete with things planners and planning "must" strive 
to do, but which they don't. Planning must be open and communicative, but often it is 
closed. Planning must be participatory and democratic, but often it is an instrument of 
domination and control. Planning must be about rationality, but often it is about power 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998; Watson, 2003). This is the "dark side" of planning and planners identi-
fied by Flyvbjerg (1996) and Yiftachel (1998), which is remarkably underexplored by 
planning researchers and theorists.  
Forecasting, too, has its dark side. It is here that "planners lie with numbers," as 
Wachs (1989) aptly put it. Planners on the dark side are busy not with getting forecasts 
right and following the AICP Code of Ethics but with getting projects funded and built. 
And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. 
Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be 
effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for construction. "The most 
effective planner," says Wachs (1989: 477), "is sometimes the one who can cloak 
advocacy in the guise of scientific or technical rationality." Such advocacy would stand 
in direct opposition to AICP's ruling that "the planner's primary obligation [is] to the 
public interest" (American Planning Association, 1991: B.2). Nevertheless, seemingly 
rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate benefits have long been an 
 33/51 
established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly 
another kind of rent-seeking behavior, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepre-
sentation which makes it extremely difficult to decide which projects deserve undertak-
ing and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry's own organs, the 
Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed 
that should not. One may add that many projects don't proceed that probably should, had 
they not lost out to projects with "better" misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 
2002). 
In this situation, the question is not so much what planners can do to reduce 
inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on planners the 
checks and balances that would give planners the incentive to stop producing biased 
forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change 
the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting 
techniques and appeals to ethics won't do here; institutional change with a focus on 
transparency and accountability is necessary. 
As argued in Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003), two basic types of 
accountability define liberal democracies: (1) public sector accountability through trans-
parency and public control, and (2) private sector accountability via competition and 
market control. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb planners' 
misrepresentation in forecasting and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals 
effectively with risk. In order to achieve accountability through transparency and public 
control, the following would be required as practices embedded in the relevant institu-
tions (the full argument for the measures may be found in Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and 
Rothengatter, 2003, chapters 9-11): 
 
• National-level government should not offer discretionary grants to local 
infrastructure agencies for the sole purpose of building a specific type of infra-
structure. Such grants create perverse incentives. Instead, national government 
should simply offer "infrastructure grants" or "transportation grants" to local 
governments, and let local political officials spend the funds however they choose 
to, but make sure that every dollar they spend on one type of infrastructure 
reduces their ability to fund another. 
• Forecasts should be made subject to independent peer review. Where large 
amounts of taxpayers' money are at stake, such review may be carried out by 
national or state accounting and auditing offices, like the General Accounting 
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Office in the US or the National Audit Office in the UK, who have the independ-
ence and expertise to produce such reviews. Other types of independent review 
bodies may be established, for instance within national departments of finance or 
with relevant professional bodies. 
• Forecasts should be benchmarked against comparable forecasts, for instance 
using reference class forecasting as described in the previous section. 
• Forecasts, peer reviews, and benchmarkings should be made available to the 
public as they are produced, including all relevant documentation. 
• Public hearings, citizen juries, and the like should be organized to allow 
stakeholders and civil society to voice criticism and support of forecasts. 
Knowledge generated in this way should be integrated in planning and decision 
making. 
• Scientific and professional conferences should be organized where forecasters 
would present and defend their forecasts in the face of colleagues' scrutiny and 
criticism. 
• Projects with inflated benefit-cost ratios should be reconsidered and stopped if 
recalculated costs and benefits do not warrant implementation. Projects with 
realistic estimates of benefits and costs should be rewarded.  
• Professional and occasionally even criminal penalties should be enforced for 
planners and forecasters who consistently and foreseeably produce deceptive 
forecasts. An example of a professional penalty would be the exclusion from 
one’s professional organization if one violates its code of ethics. An example of a 
criminal penalty would be punishment as the result of prosecution before a court 
or similar legal set-up, for instance where deceptive forecasts have led to substan-
tial mismanagement of public funds (Garett and Wachs, 1996). Malpractice in 
planning should be taken as seriously as it is in other professions. Failing to do 
this amounts to not taking the profession of planning seriously. 
 
In order to achieve accountability in forecasting via competition and market control, the 
following would be required, again as practices that are both embedded in and enforced 
by the relevant institutions: 
 
• The decision to go ahead with a project should, where at all possible, be made 
contingent on the willingness of private financiers to participate without a sover-
eign guarantee for at least one third of the total capital needs.8 This should be 
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required whether projects pass the market test or not, that is, whether projects are 
subsidized or not or provided for social justice reasons or not. Private lenders, 
shareholders, and stock market analysts would produce their own forecasts or 
would critically monitor existing ones. If they were wrong about the forecasts, 
they and their organizations would be hurt. The result would be more realistic 
forecasts and reduced risk.  
• Full public financing or full financing with a sovereign guarantee should be 
avoided. 
• Forecasters and their organizations should share financial responsibility for 
covering cost overruns and benefit shortfalls resulting from misrepresentation and 
bias in forecasting. 
• The participation of risk capital should not mean that government gives up or 
reduces control of the project. On the contrary, it means that government can 
more effectively play the role it should be playing, namely keeping the project at 
arms length as the ordinary citizen's guarantor for ensuring concerns about safety, 
environment, risk, and a proper use of public funds. 
 
Whether projects are public, private, or public-private, they should be vested in one and 
only one project organization with a strong governance framework. The project organiza-
tion may be a company or not, public or private, or a mixture. What is important is that 
this organization enforces accountability vis-à-vis contractors, operators, etc., and that, in 
turn, the directors of the organization are held accountable for any cost overruns, benefits 
shortfall, faulty designs, unmitigated risks, etc. that may occur during project planning, 
implementation, and operations. 
 If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major infra-
structure projects would effectively implement, embed, and enforce such measures of 
accountability, then the misrepresentation in cost, benefit, and risk estimates, which is 
widespread today, may be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to 
continue, and the allocation of funds for infrastructure is likely to continue to be wasteful 
and undemocratic. 
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Validity of Results Across Types of Infrastructure 
The cost data included in the study of transportation infrastructure projects presented 
above was compared with cost data for other project types in other studies including 
power plants, dams, public buildings, sports facilities, water distribution, oil and gas 
extraction, information technology systems, aerospace systems, and weapons systems 
(Arditi et al., 1985; Blake et al., 1976; Byggeriets Evaluerings Center, 2006; Canaday, 
1980; Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Department of Energy Study Group, 1975; Dlakwa 
and Culpin, 1990; Fraser, 1990; Hall, 1980; Healey, 1964; Henderson, 1977; Hufschmidt 
and Gerin, 1970; Merewitz, 1973b; Merrow, 1988; Morris and Hough, 1987; Mott 
MacDonald, 2002; National Audit Office, 2004; National Audit Office of Denmark, 
2000; National Audit Office of Norway, 2001; Norwegian Public Investigatory Commis-
sions, 1999; Preuss, 2000; Rich, 2000; Standish Group, 2004; World Bank, 1994; World 
Commission on Dams, 2000). None of these studies are as comprehensive and system-
atic as the study of transportation infrastructure presented here. Nevertheless, the data 
from the studies indicate that other types of projects are as prone to cost overrun as are 
transportation infrastructure projects. The data also indicate that cost overrun for other 
projects have neither increased nor decreased historically, and that overrun is common in 
both First- and Third-World countries, as is the case for transportation infrastructure. 
Therefore, transportation infrastructure appears to be not a unique case of cost overrun 
but, instead, one example among many of a more general phenomenon, namely cost 
overrun in infrastructure policy and planning. 
 Data on benefit shortfalls are more scarce than data on cost overrun. However, 
some of the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph contain data on benefits 
(Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Hall, 1980; Merrow, 1988; Mott MacDonald, 2002; 
Preuss, 2000; Rich, 2000; Standish Group, 2004; World Bank, 1994; World Commission 
on Dams, 2000). With the reservations that apply to sparse data, again the available data 
indicate that large and frequent benefit shortfalls are not unique to transportation infra-
structure but is a more widespread problem, common to infrastructure development in 
general. 
 
 
Towards Better Practice 
Fortunately, after decades of widespread mismanagement in megaproject policy and 
planning, signs of improvement have recently appeared. The conventional consensus that 
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deception is an acceptable way of getting projects started is under attack, as will be 
apparent from the examples below. This is in part because democratic governance is 
generally getting stronger around the world. The Enron scandal and its successors have 
triggered a war on corporate deception that is spilling over into government with the 
same objective: to reduce financial waste and promote good governance. Although 
progress is slow, good governance is gaining a foothold even in megaproject policy and 
planning. The conventional consensus is also under attack for the practical reason 
mentioned earlier that the largest projects are now so big in relation to national econo-
mies that cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and risks from even a single project may 
destabilize the finances of a whole country or region, as happened in Greece and Hong 
Kong. Lawmakers and governments begin to see that national fiscal distress is too high a 
price to pay for the conventional way of planning and designing large projects. The main 
drive for reform comes from outside the agencies and industries conventionally involved 
in infrastructure development, which increases the likelihood of success. 
 In 2003 the Treasury of the United Kingdom required, for the first time, that all 
ministries develop and implement procedures for large public projects that will curb what 
the Treasury calls--with true British civility--”optimism bias.” Funding will be unavail-
able for projects that do not take into account this bias, and methods have been devel-
oped for how to do this (Mott MacDonald, 2002; HM Treasury, 2003; Flyvbjerg and 
Cowi, 2004). In the Netherlands in 2004, the Parliamentary Committee on Infrastructure 
Projects for the first time conducted extensive public hearings to identify measures that 
will limit the misinformation about large infrastructure projects given to the Parliament, 
public, and media (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 2004). In Boston, the 
government sued to recoup funds from contractor overcharges for the Big Dig related to 
cost overruns. More governments and parliaments are likely to follow the lead of the UK, 
the Netherlands, and Boston in coming years. It’s too early to tell whether the measures 
they implement will ultimately be effective. It seems unlikely, however, that the forces 
that have triggered the measures will be reversed, and it is those forces that reform-
minded groups need to support and develop in order to curb deception and waste. This is 
the "tension-point" where convention meets reform, power-balances change, and new 
things may happen.  
 The key weapons in the war on deception and waste is accountability and critical 
questioning. The professional expertise of planners, engineers, architects, economists, 
and administrators is certainly indispensable to constructing the infrastructures that make 
society work. Studies show, however, that the claims about costs, benefits, and risks 
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made by these groups usually cannot be trusted and should be carefully examined by 
independent specialists and organizations. The same holds for claims made by project-
promoting politicians and officials. Institutional checks and balances--including finan-
cial, professional, or even criminal penalties for consistent and unjustifiable biases in 
claims and estimates of costs, benefits, and risks--should be developed and employed. 
The key principle is that the cost of making a wrong forecast should fall on those making 
the forecast, a principle often violated today. 
 Some of the public-private partnerships currently emerging in large infrastructure 
projects contain more and better checks and balances than previous institutional setups, 
as has been demonstrated by the National Audit Office (2003). This is a step in the right 
direction but should be no cause for repose. The task of turning around megaproject 
policy and planning is so difficult that all available measures for improvement must be 
employed. The conventional mode of planning and designing infrastructure has long 
historical roots and is deeply ingrained in professional and institutional practices. It 
would be naive to think it is easily toppled. Given the stakes involved--saving taxpayers 
from billions of dollars of waste, protecting citizens’ trust in democracy and the rule of 
law, avoiding the destruction of spatial and environmental assets--this shouldn‘t deter us 
from trying. 
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Table 1: Inaccuracy of transportation project cost estimates by type of project. Constant 
prices. 
Type of project No. of cases (N) Avg. cost overrun % Standard deviation 
Rail 58 44.7 38.4 
Bridges and tunnels 33 33.8 62.4 
Road 167 20.4 29.9 
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Table 2: Inaccuracy in forecasts of rail passenger and road vehicle traffic. 
Type of project No. of cases (N) Avg. inaccuracy % Standard deviation 
Rail 25 –51.4 28.1 
Road 183 9.5 44.3 
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Figure 1: Explanatory power of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation, respec-
tively, in accounting for forecasting inaccuracy as function of political and organizational 
pressure. 
 49/51 
Figure 2: Inaccuracy of construction cost forecasts for rail projects in reference class. 
Average cost increase is indicated for non-UK and UK projects, separately. Constant 
prices. 
 
 50/51 
Figure 3: Required adjustments to cost estimates for UK rail projects as function of the 
maximum acceptable level of risk for cost overrun. Constant prices. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 A "megaproject" is here defined as the most expensive infrastructure and investment projects that are 
carried out today, typically at costs per project from several hundred million to several billion dollars. 
2 All costs are construction costs measured in constant prices. Cost overrun, also sometimes called "cost 
increase" or "cost escalation," is measured according to international convention as actual out-turn costs 
minus estimated costs in percent of estimated costs. Actual costs are defined as real, accounted construc-
tion costs determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined as budgeted, or 
forecasted, construction costs at the time of decision to build. For reasons explained in Flyvbjerg, Holm, 
and Buhl (2002) and Flyvbjerg (2005b) the figures for cost overrun presented here must be considered 
conservative.--Ideally financing costs, operating costs, and maintenance costs would also be included in a 
study of costs. It is difficult, however, to find valid, reliable, and comparable data on these types of costs 
across a large number of projects. 
3 Following international convention, inaccuracy is measured as actual traffic minus estimated traffic in 
percent of estimated traffic. Rail traffic is measured as number of passengers; road traffic as number of 
vehicles. The base year for estimated traffic is the year of decision to build. The forecasting year is the first 
full year of operations (Flyvbjerg, 2005b). 
4 For each of twelve urban rail projects, data exist for both cost overrun and traffic shortfall. For these 
projects average cost overrun is 40.3 percent; average traffic shortfall is 47.8 percent. 
5 Quoted from “Under Water Over Budget,” The Economist, October 7, 1989, 37–38. 
6 It has been verified with Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo that this is indeed the first instance of refer-
ence class forecasting in practice. Personal communication, author's archives. 
7 The closest thing to an outside view in large infrastructure forecasting that the study uncovered is Gordon 
and Wilson's (1984) use of regression analysis on an international cross section of light-rail projects to 
forecast patronage in a number of light-rail schemes in North America. 
8 The lower limit of a one-third share of private risk capital for such capital to effectively influence 
accountability is based on practical experience. See more in Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003: 
120-123). 
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